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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, Congress enacted crucial protections for web sites and
other online service providers to promote the free flow of information on
the Internet. In Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act,
Congress directed that online providers cannot be liable under state laws
for content posted by users or for taking steps to restrict or screen content.
47 U.S.C. § 230. Section 230 has become the cornerstone of free speech
on the Internet, and some 300 cases in federal and state courts across the
country have recognized and enforced the broad immunity Section 230
provides, including Division I of this Court. Schneider v. Amazon. com,

Inc., 108 Wn. App. 454, 31 P.3d 37 (2001). The Superior Court in this
case failed to properly apply Section 230 and the extensive case law when
it refused to dismiss claims against Backpage.com 1 that are indisputably
based on content posted by users.
Plaintiffs (Appellees here) are three minors who allege they were
prostituted by adult pimps. In this lawsuit, they seek to hold
Backpage.com responsible for this abuse because the pimps allegedly
posted ads concerning Plaintiffs on the Backpage.com website.
Backpage.com asserts that Section 230 precludes such claims.
The Superior Court rejected all but one of Plaintiffs' attempts to
avoid Section 230. The court ultimately credited Plaintiffs' allegations

1 Appellants

(Defendants in the Superior Court) Village Voice Media
Holdings, LLC; Backpage.com, LLC; and New Times Media, LLC are
referred to collectively here as "Backpage.com."

1

that, because Backpage.com imposes and enforces rules banning improper
posts, the website itself is "responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation
or development" of content and therefore outside Section 230's
protections. The court found that those rules could show Backpage.com
might or should know that some posts are "for prostitution," and, as the
court put it, "[I]sn't [that] assisting with development?" The short answer
is no; indeed, the law is precisely the opposite.
No court has ever held that a website loses Section 230's
protections by imposing rules to prohibit unlawful content. This would
turn Section 230 on its head. Rather than encourage providers to police
third-party content, as Congress expressly intended, this would discourage
websites from imposing rules or reviewing content at all. Moreover,
under well-established precedent, Section 230 immunity cannot be
overcome by allegations that a website knows or should know third-party
content is unlawful. In fact, a website is immune even if it receives actual

notice ofthe alleged illegality and fails to remove the content. A contrary
rule would destroy Congress's intent to protect providers for exercising
traditional publisher functions of reviewing, editing, and deciding whether
or not to post content. Equally clear, a plaintiff may not overcome Section
230 by alleging that the nature of a website "encourages" illegality. That
would contravene the fundamental principle that a website can be liable
only if it creates or requires the specific content that is unlawful.
The Superior Court acknowledged its decision conflicts with
reported case law. The court also admitted it struggled with

2

Backpage.com's motion in light of Washington's liberal CR 12(b)(6)
standards, stating that the motion "really walks the line" and was "the
closest [the Coprt had] ever come" to granting a 12(b)(6) dismissal. But, if
Washington's pleading standards require a state court not to find Section
230 immunity in a circumstance when a federal court undoubtedly would,
the Superior Court's ruling also cannot stand because state procedural rules
cannot undermine federal substantive rights. This Court need not reach
this issue, however, because Section 230 immunity does apply to
Backpage.com, and the result should be the same in any court.
Fortunately, the Superior Court certified its order for immediate
review under RAP 2.3(b)(4), and this Court granted review. Prompt review
(and reversal) is particularly important given that Section 230 provides
immunity from suit, not merely a defense to liability. Websites lose this

immunity if a court refuses to apply Section 230 at the earliest stage of the
case (i.e., on a 12(b)(6) motion), forcing them to fight protracted and costly
legal battles.
This Court should reverse the Superior Court's ruling, direct that all
claims against Backpage.com be dismissed, and thus preserve and respect
Section 230 immunity and the critical First Amendment rights it protects
across the Internet.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Superior Court improperly refused to dismiss claims against
Backpage.com based on content provided by third parties, instead ruling
that Backpage.com is not entitled to the protections of Section 230

3

because it imposes rules to prohibit improper content, an unprecedented
result that contravenes Section 230 and its purposes.
III.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Factual Background

According to their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs are three
minors who ran away from home and were recruited into prostitution by
"professional adult pimps," defendant Baruti Hopson and two "unnamed
individuals." See CP 2 ~ 1.2. The complaint says almost nothing about
the pimps, except that they prostituted the three Plaintiffs, "engaged in
[immoral] communications" with them, "took naked and illicit
photographs" of them, and posted ads about them on Backpage.com. See
CP 3-20 ~~ 2.8,5.1-5.2,6.1-6.3. Everything else in Plaintiffs' 26-page
complaint targets Backpage.com.

It is undisputed that Backpage.com did not create the ads;
Plaintiffs admit the pimps created, posted and uploaded the ads about
them. See, e.g., CP 2 ~ 1.2 ("adult pimps ... posted advertisements for the
girls"); CP 17 ~ 5.2 ("adult pimps ... create[d] ... and then uploaded [the]
advertisements of S.L. onto ... Backpage.com"); CP 3-20 ~~ 2.8, 4.1, 6.2,
6 ..3. Plaintiffs also admit that all users post ads on Backpage.com through
an automated process and have no personal contact with anyone at
Backpage.com. CP 12-13 ~ 3.19. Consistent with their allegations
challenging Backpage.com as a whole, Plaintiffs attached to their
complaint hundreds of ads from the website posted by and concerning
others, see CP 7-10 ~~ 3.7,3.8,3.14 & CP 495-2771, but did not provide
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or quote the specific ads they challenge, except to reference certain
headlines, see CP 16, 20 ~~ 4.1,6.3.
Plaintiffs further acknowledge that Backpage.com imposes rules
prohibiting improper ads on the website, including specifically ads that
concern or allude to prostitution or underage sex trafficking. See CP 6-10
~~

3.6-3.13. For example, Plaintiffs allege that "[s]exually explicit

language is forbidden by Backpage.com and ads containing such are
rejected," CP 7 ~ 3.6; Backpage.com imposes rules prohibiting "naked
images [or] images using transparent clothing," any "content which
advertises an illegal service," and any "suggest[ion of] an exchange of sex
acts for money," CP 8 ~ 3.9; and users seeking to post ads must accept the
posting rules, attest that they are at least 18 years of age, CP 12 ~ 3.19, and
agree not to post any "obscene or lewd ... photographs," "any solicitation
directly or in 'coded' fashion for any illegal service," br "any material ...
that exploits minors in any way," CP 9 ~ 3.13. Plaintiffs also admit
Backpage.com "removes ads that violate [its] requirements." CP 8 ~ 3.9.
Plaintiffs do not allege that the ads in this case violated the posting rules;
to the contrary, they allege the ads by all appearances complied with the
rules banning improper posts. CP 16-20 ~~ 4.1,5.2,6.4.
These are essentially all the factual allegations 'in ;Plaintiffs' First
Amended Complaint. The balance of the complaint consists of many
variations of Plaintiffs' arguments (couched as allegations offered "upon
information and belief') that all escort ads are ads for prostitution, CP 46 ~~ 3.1, 3.2, 3.5, and that the website's rules and restrictions prohibiting

5

improper content are "window dressing," CP 7 ~ 3.7, and "a fraud and a
ruse" CP 10 ~ 3.14, to allow Backpage.com to "fly under the radar," CP 6
~

3.6. In essence, Plaintiffs allege that Backpage.com's efforts to monitor,

police and restrict content demonstrate that "the purpose" of the "entire
website" "is exactly what its content requirements ... prohibit."CP 10
~

3.14. Based on this and assertions about the website's "context," CP 4-5

~

3.1, Plaintiffs contend Backpage.com is not entitled to Section 230

immunity but instead is liable for all claims by any person allegedly based
on any and all ads on the site. See, e.g., CP 185-210. More specifically,
Plaintiffs claim Backpage.com is liable for their claims of negligence,
outrage, sexual exploitation in violation ofRCW ch. 9.68A, vicarious
liability, unjust enrichment, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy. CP
22-25 ~~ 7.1-7.21, 7.25-26.

B.

Proc'edural History

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on July 30,2012, against
two of the Backpage.com Defendants and Baruti Hopson, tQ.e pimp who is
an indigent and is currently in prison after his conviction for crimes of
abusing and prostituting Plaintiff J.S. CP 3 ~ 2.8. Plaintiffs never served
the original complaint onBackpage.com, but instead filed a First
Amended Complaint on September 5, 2012, which they did serve.
Backpage.com removed the action to federal court on December 5,2013
on the basis that Plaintiffs misjoined Hopson as a defendant to defeat
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diversity jurisdiction. The federal court remanded the case on March 5,
2013. 2
On March 25, 2013, Backpage.com moved in the Superior Court to
dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint because Section 230
provides immunity to online service providers for state-law claims based
on content provided by third parties. CP 155-184. In opposition,
Plaintiffs did not dispute that Backpage.com satisfied the three requisite
elements for Section 230 protection (as discussed below). Instead, they
argued their complaint should survive based on their allegations that
Backpage.com itself"develops" content because the website (1) contains a
category for

~scort

ads; (2) makes information useable and available; and

(3) imposes posting rules and restrictions expressly prohibiting unlawful
content, which, they contend, are meant to encourage such content. See
CP 185-210.
The Superior Court (Hon. Susan K. Setko) heard argument on
April 26,2013. See Verbatim Report of Proceedings ("RP"). The court
rejected Plaintiffs' first two arguments, noting that a website cannot be a
content developer for making information available and useable (since all
websites do this) nor for having a category for escort ads (a legal activity).
RP 13:24-15:8,23:8-23:19. The court also rejected Plaintiffs' contention
that Backpage.com "conspires" with users who access its site and post ads,
2 Although Plaintiffs acknowledge that Hopson is the person responsible
for prostituting Plaintiff 1.S. and creating and posting ads about her, they
have done nothing to pursue claims against him, notwithstanding that he
has been in default in this action for over 15 months.
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as that would destroy the purposes of Section 230. Id. at 45 :14-46:6; 50: 150:5.
However, the court denied Backpage.com's motion to dismiss
because it credited Plaintiffs' allegations that Backpage.com's posting
rules prohibiting improper content showed the website "assist[ed] with the
development" of user content and knew or should have knoWn that users
might post unlawful ads. The court stated:
These are where I'm most concerned, this is what I
highlighted over and over again and reread, it's the posting
guidelines. And, frankly, my note to myself in the sideline
was Backpage doesn't know this is for prostitution and
isn't assisting with the development? And, despite the case
law, I answer that question just on the side of the plaintiffs
and I'm denying a 12(b)(6).
Id. at 50:5-50: 12. The court indicated it had reviewed some federal cases
concerning Section 230, including MA. v. Village Voice Media Holdings,

LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011), which held that
Backpage.com was immune for identical claims. See RP 4:13-5:7; 18:1418:17; 26:10-26:12; 27:7-27:19; 35:4-35:10; 39:8-39:15; 43:14-44:21.
The court denied Backpage.com's motion "despite the case law." Id. at
50:10.
In denying Backpage.com's motion, the court emphasized the
"high standard" under CR 12(b)(6), requiring it to credit Plaintiffs'
allegations. Id. at 18:7-18:8 ("a defendant's motion to dismiss based on
12(b)(6) is a pretty high standard"); id. at 29:6-29:9 (stating in response to
Plaintiffs' assertion that they are entitled to every inference: "You're

8

preaching to the choir."); id. at 4:13-4:14 ("the decision of the Court turns
on the allegations"). In the end, the court said this case was the closest it
had ever come to granting a 12(b)(6) motion:
[T]he question is did Congress tell Superior Court trial .
judges that you have to - that you are entitled to ignore the
CDA or do you have to enforce it? This case is - honestly,
this is, I think, of all the cases in terms of the 12(b)(6) or
summary judgment for that matter, is the closest that I've
ever come. I mean, it's right on the line and with due
respect to the fabulous briefing and the great arguments, it
really walks the line for me this case, it's right on the edge.
Id at 49: 18-50: 1. But the court also stated, "I think this needs appellate
review," id. at 50:12-50:13, and recommended certification under RAP
2.3(b)(4), while staying all other proceedings in the trial court. Id. at
50:24-50:25; 52:16-52:19; see also CP 484-85.
Backpage.com filed a motion for discretionary review in this Court
on June 12,2013. Mot. for Discretionary Review. Plaintiffs responded by
agreeing that the Superior Court's decision presents a controlling question
of law and immediate review would materially advance the litigation.
PIs.' Resp. to Mot. for Discretionary Review at 4-5. Two public interest
groups devoted to Internet free speech (the Electronic Frontier Foundation
and the Center for Democracy and Technology) filed an amicus brief
underscoring the need for this Court to correct the Superior Court's
"reversible error" and "ensure the proper application of [Section 230's]
protections." Amicus Br. at 2, 18.
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This Court granted Backpage.com's motion for discretionary
review on July 26, 2013, finding that it presented "a controlling question
of law" and "the issue of immunity from suit warrants review pursuant to
RAP 2.3(b)." Ruling Granting Discretionary Review at 3, 4. The Court
outlined the questions for review as (1) whether an Internet service
provider loses Section 230 immunity based on allegations that it
"encourages" unlawful third-party content or allegedly should know that
users may post such content, (2) whether "mere creation of posting
guidelines is [sufficient] to transform [the website] into an information
content provider;" and (3) whether "our state's pleading standards [under
CR 12(b)(6)] improperly trump[] federal law" "in reviewing claims of
immunity under federal law." Id. at 4-6.

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

Congress Enacted Section 230 to Promote Free Speech
and Encourage Self-Policing on the Internet.

Section 230(c)(1) unambiguously bars suits against websites and
other online service providers predicated on content provided by third
parties. Its key provision states: "No provider ... of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider." 47 U.S.C.

§ 230(c)(1). A website user who submits content- as millions of users do
on thousands of web sites every day - is an "information content provider"
under the statute's definition of a party "responsible, in whole or in part,
for the creation or development of information." Id. § 230(t)(3). Thus, a

10

website or other online provider loses Section 230 immunity only if it
"create[s]" or "develop[s]" the allegedly unlawful content itself. Section
230 expressly preempts state laws that would impose liability on online
providers contrary to its terms: "[N]o liability may be imposed under any
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section." Id. § 230(e)(3).
Congress enacted Section 230 to achieve two goals. First, it
"wanted to encourage the unfettered and unregulated development of free
speech on the Internet, and to promote the development of e-commerce."
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Ben Ezra,
Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.3 (lOth Cir.
2000) (Section 230 is meant "to promote freedom of speech"); 47 U.S.C. §
230(b)(2)(3) (Section 230 is intended to "preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet."). Second,
Congress sought to encourage online service providers to "self-police"
potentially harmful or offensive material on their services by providing
immunity for such efforts. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028; see also 47 U.S.C.

§ 230(c)(2).
Congress made these goals manifest in expressly rejectingStratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995), with the passage of Section 230. See S. Corn. Rep. No.
104-230 (1996) (expressing intent to overrule Stratton Oakmont and "any
other similar decisions"). In Stratton Oakmont, a New York trial court
held the online service Prodigy liable for defamatory comments posted by
a user on one of its bulletin boards, applying common law principles that a
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publisher (unlike a distributor) can be liable for posts even if it did not
know or have any reason to know they were defamatory. 1995 WL
323710 at *5. The court treated Prodigy as a publisher (rather than as a
distributor) because it screened and edited bulletin board messages to
prevent offensive content. Id. By overruling this result, Congress
eliminated the "grim choice" such a precedent would present to online
service providers, i.e., those that voluntarily police content could be
responsible for all posts, while "providers that bury their heads in the sand
and ignore problematic posts would escape liability altogether." Fair
Hous. Council ofSan Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1029
("If efforts to review and omit third-party defamatory, obscene or
inappropriate material make a computer service provider or user liable for
posted speech, then website operators and Internet service providers are
likely to abandon efforts to eliminate such material from their site[s].").
Section 230 reflects the practical realities ofthe Internet. It is
simply impossible for online service providers to screen all third-party
content and decide what mayor may not be unlawful, given the Internet's
"millions of users" and "staggering" amount of information. Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d327, 331 (4thCir.1997). "Section230therefore
sought to prevent lawsuits from shutting down websites and other services
on the Internet." Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028. "The specter of tort liability in
an area of such prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect,"
because "[f]aced with potential liability for each message republished ... ,
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providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of
messages posted." Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
Congress also recognized that some material posted on the Internet
could be harmful but made a policy choice that "plaintiffs may hold liable
the person who creates or develops unlawful content, but not the
interactive computer service provider who merely enables that content to
be posted online." Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc.,
591 F.3d 250,254 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528
F.3d 413,419-20 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding social networking site immune
for claims premised on sexual assault resulting from online
communications); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119,
1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (matchmaking website immune from claims
stemming from fake profile that led to threats against the plaintiff); Zeran,
129 F.3d at 331 (AOL immune for false advertisements created by users
and for failing to remove the ads promptly after notice, even though
plaintiff received death threats).

B.

Section 230 Provides Broad Immunity to Online Service
Providers.

Consistent with its express terms and Congress's purposes, courts
nationwide have interpreted Section 230 to establish broad immunity for
online service providers. The eight federal circuit courts that have
addressed Section 230 have all found that the statute broadly insulates
online providers for claims based on third-party content. See Carafano,
339 F.3d at 1123 (noting a "consensus" among "courts of appeal that
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§ 230(c) provides broad immunity for publishing content provided
primarily by third parties,,). 3 Numerous federal district courts have
reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 910 F.
Supp. 2d 314,318 (D.D.C. 2012) ("By its plain terms, then, the CDA
immunizes internet computer service providers from liability for the
publication of infQrmation or speech originating from thi~d parties.,,).4

See also Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010) ("The
majority of federal circuits have interpreted [Section 230] to establish
broad federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service
providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the
service." (internal quotations marks omitted)); Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d
at 418 ("Courts have construed the immunity provisions in § 230 broadly
in all cases arising from the publication of user-generated content.");
Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. CraigsJist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (dismissing claims against
Craigslist based on Section 230, noting "[a]n interactive computer service
'causes' postings only in the sense of providing a place where people can
post"); Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419
(1 st Cir. 2007) ("[W]e too find that Section 230 immunity should be
broadly construed."); Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465,471 (3d Cir.
2003) ("By its terms, § 230 provides immunity to AOL as a publisher or
speaker of information originating from another information content
provider."); Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 984-85 (Section 230 "creates a federal
immunity to any state law cause of action that would hold computer
service providers liable for information originating with a third-party");
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 ("Congress considered the weight of the speech
interests implicated and chose to immunize service providers to avoid any
such restrictive effect.").
3

See also Courtney v. Vereb, 2012 WL 2405313, at *4-6 (B.D. La., June
25,2012); Goddardv. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193,1197 (N.D.
Cal. 2009); Murawski v. Pataki~ 514 F. Supp. 2d 577, 591 (S.D.N.Y.
2007); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843,851-52 (W.D. Tex.
2007); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492,500-01 (E.D. Pa.
2006); Dimeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 530-31 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff'd,
248 Fed. App'x (3d Cir. 2007); Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F.

4
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The same is true of state courts, one of which noted that some 300
reported decisions have construed Section 230, and "[a]ll but a handful ...
find that the website is entitled to immunity from liability." Hill v.
StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 558 (N.C. App. 2012) (holding ticket

exchange website immune under Section 230 notwithstanding plaintiff's
allegations that it knew of or encouraged ticket scalping in violation of
state law).5
Division I of this Court reached the same conclusion in Schneider,
108 Wn. App. 454. There, an author asserted claims against Amazon for
allegedly defamatory third-party comments posted about him on the
Amazon.com website. On a CR 12(b)(6) motion, the trial court dismissed
the claims with prejudice on the ground that Amazon was immune under
Section 230. Id It did so even though the plaintiff alleged he provided
notice to Amazon that the posts were improper and that Amazon admitted
one or more violated its guidelines yet still failed to remove them .. Id. at
•

j '

.

458. Division I affirmed, recognizing that Section 230 was intended to

Supp. 2d 532, 538-40 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff'd, 2004 WL 602711 (4th Cir.
Mar. 24, 2004); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44,50-52 (D.D.C.
1998).
See also Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. olN.Y., 17 N.Y.3d 281,952 N.E.2d
1011, 1017 (2011) ("we follow what may fairly be called the national
consensus and read section 230 as generally immunizing Internet service
providers from liability for third-party content" (internal citations
omitted)); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 146 P.3d 510, 522 (2006)
(Section 230 "broadly shield[s] all providers from liability for 'publishing'
information received from third parties"); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So.
2d 1010, 1018 (Fla. 2001).
5
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preserve the vibrant and free flow of information on the Internet and to
remove disincentives for service providers to block and filter information.
Id at 461-62. It found the plaintiff's claims would hold Amazon liable for

editorial functions - i.e., "deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone
or alter content" or "the failure to remove [content]" - exactly what
"Congress sought to protect." Id. at 463,466. Indeed, the Court opined
that Section 230 provides immunity "even where the interactive service
provider has an active, even aggressive role in making available content
prepared by others." Id. at 466-67 (citation omitted). Noting that Section
230 overruled Stratton Oakmont, the Court found that Congress
"deliberately chose not to deter harmful online speech by means of civil
liability on companies that 'serve as intermediaries for other parties'
potentially injurious messages.'" Id at 463 (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at
330-31). To the contrary, as the Court noted, Congress "intended to
"encourage self-regulation, and immunity is the form of that
encouragement." Id

C.

Backpage.com Did Not "Develop" Content Under the
Case Law Interpreting Section 230, Particularly
Roommates. com.

Section 230 sets forth a three-part test to determine when an online
service provider is entitled to immunity from suit. An online service is
immune if: (1) it is a "provider ... of an 'interactive computer service,'''
(2) the plaintiffs claim treats it "as a publisher or speaker of information,"
and (3) that information is "provided by another 'information content
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provider.'" See Schneider, 108 Wn. App. at 460; accord Batzel, 333 F.3d
at 1037; Lycos, 478 F.3d at 418.
All three elements are present here, and the Superior Court did not
find otherwise. First, Backpage.com, as a website, is a "provider ... of an
interactive computer service." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see Schneider, 108
Wn. App. at 461-63; Roommates. com, 521 F.3d at 1162 n.6 (websitesare
the "most common interactive computer services"). Second, Plaintiffs
base their claims on "information provided by another information content
provider," i.e., the ads created and posted by the pimps. See, e.g., CP 3-21
~~ 2.8,4.1,4.2,5.2,5.3,6.2,6.3,6.5. 6 Finally, Plaintiffs' claims treat

Backpage.com "as the publisher or speaker" of the ads because they
"seek[] to hold" it liable for "exercis[ing] a publisher's traditional editorial
functions, such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or
alter content." See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
Rather than contest these elements, Plaintiffs contended
Backpage.com is not entitled to immunity because, they argued, the
website is itself an "information content provider." CP 194-201. The
Superior Court rejected nearly all of Plaintiffs' asserted theories, but
ultimately agreed with their conclusion, holding that Plaintiffs sufficiently
The fact that Plaintiffs seek the same relief from Backpage.com for
operating its website as they do against Hopson for posting ads and
exploiting, prostituting and assaulting Plaintiff J.S. underscores that they
are seeking to treat Backpage.com as the publisher or speaker of the ads.
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 ("Our view that [plaintiffs] complaint treats
AOL as a publisher is reinforced because AOL is cast in the same position
as the party who originally posted the offensive messages.")
6
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alleged that Backpage.com "assist[ed] with the development" of content
because they alleged the site imposes rules to preclude improper content.
RP 50:5-50:12. The court's conclusion is entirely unprecedented,
inconsistent with the terms and intent of Section 230, and contradicts
essentially all case law interpreting the statute.
Section 230 defines "information content provider" as "any person
or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). Because Section
230 immunity is "quite robust," courts have "adopt[ed] a relatively
expansive definition of 'interactive computer service and a relatively
restrictive definition of 'information content provider.'" Carafano, 339
F.3d at 1123. Thus, courts have held that web sites "develop" content only
if they directly participate in creating the specific content all~ged to be
unlawful or require users to provide such content. Roommates. com, 521
F.3d at 1174; FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir..
2009). On the other hand, courts have rejected attempts to evade Section
230 through allegations that a website "encouraged" or acquiesced in the
submission of content, because such theories would "cut the heart out of'
Section 230. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174 (discussed below).
In their efforts to characterize Backpage.com as an "information
content provider," Plaintiffs have relied primarily on the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Roommates. com, see CP 186, 192-198, 204; Pls~' Resp. to
Mot. for Discretionary Review at 6, 7, 12, and the Superior Court focused
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on that case too, see RP 4:13-5:7; 9:7-9:9; 12:11-13:23; 16:25-17:18. Yet,
Plaintiffs have merely taken snippets of the Ninth Circuit's opinion out of
context,? while ignoring the facts and holdings of the case, the court's
reasoning, and the narrow exception to Section 230 immunity it found. In
fact, Roommates. com rejected the same theories Plaintiffs advance.
Roommates.com concerned a website designed to match

prospective roommates. One portion of the site required users to answer
questions by making selections from drop-down menus, including about
their gender, sexual orientation, and whether they lived with children.
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1161. The site also required users to specify

whether they would prefer to live with others based on the same criteria
and created profile pages searchable by these criteria. Id. Two housing
groups sued Roommates.com, arguing it did online what a housing broker
could not lawfully do in person, i.e., use discriminatory factors for housing
rentals. Id at 1162.
Roommates.com argued that Section 230 shielded it from these
claims, but the Ninth Circuit disagreed, because, it found as to certain
features the site was "responsible ... for the creation or development" of
the allegedly unlawful content. The court held that "a website helps to
develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to Section

See, e.g., Pis.' Resp. to Mot. for Discretionary Review at 8-9 ("The
[CDA] was not meant to create a lawless no-man's-land on the internet."
(quoting Roommates. com, 521 F.3d at 1164)); CP 198 (asserting
Roommates.com means that "if a website encourages illegal content, it
loses immunity," although the decision says no such thing).

7
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230, ifit contributes materially to the alleged illegality o/the content." Id.

at 1168 (emphasis added). Roommates.com did this, the court found,
because it authored questions to elicit discriminatory preferences and
required users to answer the questions. Id. at 1166. "By requiring
subscribers to provide the information as a condition of accessing its
service, and by providing a limited set of pre-populated answers," the
court wrote, "Roommate becomes much more than a passive transmitter of
information provided by others; it becomes the developer, at least in part,
of that information." Id.
As the Ninth Circuit emphasized, the crux of its decision was that
the site required users to submit allegedly unlawful content. 8 Courts
applying Roommates. com have interpreted it the same way - as "carv[ing]
out only a narrow exception" that "turned entirely on the website's
decision to force subscribers to divulge the protected characteristics and
discriminatory preferences as a condition of using its services." Goddard,
640 F. Supp. 2d at 1198-99 (internal quotation marks omitted).9
See, e.g., 521 F.3d at 1167 ("Roommate designed its search system ...
based on the preferences and personal characteristics that RoonUnate itself
forces subscribers to disclose."); id. at 1170, n.26 ("it is Roommate that
forces users to express a preference and Roommate that forces users to
disclose the information that can form the basis of discrimination by
others"); id. at 1172 ("Roommate does not merely provide a framework
that could be utilized for proper or improper purposes; rather, Roommate's
work in developing the discriminatory questions, discriminatory answers
and discriminatory search mechanism is directly related to the alleged
illegality of the site.").

.8

See also At!. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d
690, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding Roommates. com "readily

9
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Yet, the Ninth Circuit also emphasized that courts must not read
the term "develop" so broadly as to sap Section 230 of its meaning:
It's true that the broadest sense of the term "develop" could
include ... just about any function performed by a website.
But to read the term so broadly would defeat the purposes
of section 230 by swallowing up every bit of the immunity
that the section otherwise provides.
Rommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167. The court made this distinction plain in

a second holding, concluding Roommates.com was immune from claims
stemming from a section of the site for users to provide "Additional
Comments." Roommates.com was "not responsible, in whole or in part,
for the development of this content," because the website could not review
every post, making it "precisely the kind of situation for which section 230
was designed to provide immunity." Id. at 1174. The court analogized
this part of the Roommates.com website to Craigslist (which, notably, is
structured the same as Backpage.com), in that users are given an open
field to enter information they choose "without any ... requirement to
enter discriminatory information." Id. at 1172 n.33.
The plaintiffs alleged that the site encouraged subscribers to make
discriminatory statements in the comments field because it required
discriminatory preferences in the registration process. Id. at .1174. The

distinguishable" because it "was based solely on the fact that the content
on the website that was discriminatory was supplied by Roommates.com
itself'); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 663, 665 (E.D. Tex. 2009)
(distinguishing Roommates. com because "[t]he Ninth Circuit repeatedly
stated ... that the Roommates.com website required its users to provide
certain information as a condition of its use ....").
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Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, emphasizing that courts must reject
theories of "implicit encouragement," as they would gut Section 230:
[T]here will always be close cases where a clever lawyer
could argue that something the website operator did
encouraged the illegality. Such close cases, we believe, .
must be resolved in favor of immunity, lest we cut the heart
out ofsection 230 by forcing websites to face death by ten
thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that they promoted
or encouraged - or at least tacitly assented - to the
illegality of third parties. Where it is very clear that the
website directly participates in developing the alleged
illegality - as it is clear here with respect to Roommate's
questions, answers and the resulting profile pages immunity will be lost. But in cases of enhancement by
implication or development by inference - such as with
respect to the "Additional Comments" here - section 230
must be interpreted to protect websites not merely from
ultimate liability, but from having to fight costly and
protracted legal battles.
Id. at 1174-75 (emphasis added).

The line drawn by Roommates. com is clear. To find that a website
is an "information content provider" not entitled to Section 230 immunity,
it must be "very clear" that it directly participated in developing the
specific content claimed to be illegal - by creating and posting the
unlawful content itself or requiring users to submit such content. But
when a plaintiff alleges a website "promoted or encouraged" or "tacitly
assented" to the illegality of third-party content, that will not defeat
Section 230 immunity. Plaintiffs' claims in this case are exactly what
Roommates. com cautioned against-a "clever lawyer ... argu[ing] that
something the website operator did encouraged the illegality" - a
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circumstance that "must be resolved in favor of immunity, lest we cut the
heart out of Section 230." 521 F.3d at 1174 (emphasis in original).
Roommates. com is consistent with many other cases holding that a

plaintiff cannot evade Section 230 immunity by alleging a website
somehow "encourages" unlawful content. See, e.g., Hill, 727 S.E.2d at
560 ("the fact that a website acted in such a manner as to encourage the
publication of unlawful material does not preclude a finding of immunity
pursuant to [Section] 230"); Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F.
Supp. 2d 450,476 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ("[T]here is simply 'no authority for
the proposition that [encouraging the publication of defamatory content]
makes the website operator responsible, in whole or in part, for the
'creation or development' of every post on the site" (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F.
Supp. 2d 929,933 (D. Ariz. 2008) (holding the ripoffreport,com website
was not an information content provider even though it allegedly
encouraged defamatory reviews by others for its financial benefit); S. C. v.
Dirty World, LLC, 2012 WL 3335284, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12,2012)

("As a matter oflaw, and even if true, encouraging defamatory posts is not
sufficient to defeat CDA immunity.").
This makes good sense. If any plaintiff could eliminate Section
230 simply by alleging that a website "encouraged" unlawful content,
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Section 230 would become meaningless and websites wo~ld be forced to
preclude or severely restrict user speech to avoid liability. 10

D.

Until Now, Every Court Has Rejected Claims Such as
Plaintiffs Assert.

Plaintiffs' claims are a virtual carbon copy of ones that have been
rejected before. Courts have held that classified advertis~g websitesBackpage.com specifically, but also Craigslist - are not information
content providers and are immune from claims alleging they promoted or
aided prostitution or sex trafficking because of user ads.
In MA. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d
1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011), a federal court granted dismissal under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of a sex trafficking victim's nearly identical claims
against Backpage.com advancing the same arguments to avoid Section
230 as here. In that case, the minor plaintiff alleged she was victimized by
an adult pimp who took illicit photos and posted them in ads on
Backpage.com, resulting in "multiple sexual liaisons for money with adult
male customers." Id. at 1043-44. She claimed Backpage.com was
"responsible in part for the development and/or creation of information
provided through the internet" because it "creat[ed] a highly viewed
website" with "categorized advertising for escorts," imposed "posting
To avoid any doubt created by Plaintiffs' mischaracterizations in the
Superior Court, Backpage.com categorically denies that its website
"encourages" illegal content of any kind. In fact, it employs extensive
measures (including using automated filters and manually reviewing ads)
to prevent illegal or improper content. However, as explained above,
Section 230 applies regardless.
10
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rules and limitations which ... create the veil of legality," but allegedly
"had knowledge" that "po stings on their website were advertisements for
prostitution" and that the website "was used for advertisements for illegal
sexual contact with minors." Id at 1044. She further alleged that
Backpage.com therefore "had a desire that these posters accomplish[] their
nefarious illegal prostitution activities so that the posters would return to
the website and pay for more posting." Id. at 1045.
Examining Roommmates. com and other cases, the MA. court
rejected all these arguments, held Backpage.com immune under Section
230, and dismissed the case outright. The court found that the plaintiff
could not overcome Section 230 based on arguments about the nature of
the website or that it provided a category for adult escort ads, because
users, not Backpage.com, create the content of ads and choose the
categories where ads will appear. Id at 1044, 1049. Similarly, it was
irrelevant that the plaintiff alleged Backpage.com encouraged ads to
generate revenues because "[t]he fact that a website elicits online content
for profit is immaterial," and the only relevant inquiry is whether the
service provider or third parties create the content at issue. Id at 1050
(quoting Goddardv. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 5245490, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 17,2008». The court likewise rejected arguments that
Backpage.com should not be immune on grounds that it allegedly knew or
should have known "of minors being sexually trafficked on its website, '"
because "notice of the unlawful nature of the information provided is not
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enough to make it the service provider's own, speech." Id. at 1050
(quoting Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420).11
Finally, the MA. court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to treat
Backpage.com as a "developer" of content under Section 230 because of
the nature ofthe website and content generally. The court noted that the
key question is whether the website was "responsible for the development
ofthe specific content that was the source of the alleged liability," id. at
1051 (quoting Accusearch, 570 F .3d at 1198), or, put more simply,
whether the website "created the offending ads," id. (quoting Dart v.

Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967 (N.D. Ill. 2009)). The MA.
court held that, despite the plaintiffs accusations about Backpage.com as
a whole, it was not an "information content provider" under Section 230
because the plaintiff had not alleged the site was "responsible for the
development of any portion of the content of [the pimp's] posted ads or
specifically encouraged the development ofthe offensive nature of that
content." Id. at 1052 (emphasis in original).
The MA. court recognized the plaintiffs "dismay with the scope
of [Section 230] immunity," but found that Congress's choice is clear SeCtion 230 "errs on the side of robust communication an,d prevents the
plaintiffs from moving forward with their claims." Id. at 1053 (quoting

11 The near-verbatim similarities between the allegations in MA; and
Plaintiffs' complaint in this case cannot be overemphasized and can only
be appreciated by comparing the two. See MA., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1043~
45.
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PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko's, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069,1072 (D.S.D.
2001)).

Dart v. Craigslist, 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, reached the same result,
rejecting claims by the Cook County sheriff that Craigslist created a public
nuisance and aided and abetted prostitution. The sheriff alleged that even
though Craigslist prohibited illegal content, users routinely posted ads
promising sex for money, and therefore Craigslist allegedly made it easier .
for prostitutes, pimps, and patrons to conduct business. Id. at 962-63. The
court dismissed the claims on a 12(b)(6) motion, holding that Craigslist
could not be culpable for content provided by customers who misuse its
service. Id. at 967. Even if "users routinely flout Craigslist's guidelines,"
Craigslist had not caused them to do so, except "in the sense that no one
could post [unlawful content] if craigslist did not offer a forum." Id. at
967, 969 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The court found that
"[n]othing in the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any
particular listing." Id. at 968 (quoting Chicago Lawyers' Comm., 519 F.3d
at 671). And it explained that "Plaintiffs argument that Craigslist causes
or induces illegal content is further undercut by the fact that Craigslist
repeatedly warns users not to post such content." Id. at 969 .. In the end,
the court disregarded the sheriffs "conclusory allegations ... that
Craigslist induces users to post ads for illegal services," reasoning that
Section 230 "would serve little purpose if companies like Craigslist were
found liable under state law for 'causing' or 'inducing' users to post
unlawful content in this fashion." Id. The court concluded: "Sheriff Dart

27

may continue to use Craigslist's website to identify and pursue individuals
who post allegedly unlawful content ... [bJut he cannot sue Craigslist for
their conduct." Id. (citation omitted).
The MA. and Dart decisions are not alone. In many other cases,
plaintiffs have sued websites claiming they were sexually abused as a
result of third-party content on the sites, and in every case courts have
dismissed the claims under Section 230. See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, 528
F.3d at 420 (dismissing claims brought on behalf of a minor who was
sexually assaulted after meeting a man through the MySpace website:
"[Plaintiffs'] claims are barred by [Section 230], notwithstanding their
assertion that they only seek to hold MySpace liable for its failure to
implement measures that would have prevented [the abuse]. Their
allegations are merely another way of claiming that MySpace was liable
for ... third-party-generated content."); Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 175 Cal.
App. 4th 561,96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148, 156-57 (2009) ("[Plaintiffs] want
MySpace to ensure that sexual predators do not gain access to (Le.,
communicate with) minors on its Web site. That type of activity - to
restrict or make available certain material - is expressly covered by
section 230."); Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 727-28 (N.D.
Ohio 2007) ("At the end of the day ... Plaintiff is seeking to hold
SexSearch liable for its publication of third-party content and harms
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flowing from the dissemination of that content. ... Section 230 specifically
proscribes liability in such circumstances." (citations omitted». 12
This does not mean that injured parties have no recourse - "they
may sue the third-party user who generated the content, but not the
interactive computer service that enabled them to publish the content
online." Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d at 419; accord Schneider, 108 Wn.
App. at 463 (Congress "deliberately chose not to deter harmful speech by
means of civil liability on 'companies that serve as intermediaries for
other parties' potentially injurious messages.'" (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at
330-31»; Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 254. Thus, in this case, Plaintiffs
may pursue claims against Hopson and the other alleged pimps, but they
cannot seek recovery from Backpage.com for ads the pimps created and
posted on the Backpage.com website.

E.

The Superior Court Misconstrued Section 230 As No
Court Has Ever Done.

Plaintiffs advanced three arguments in the Superior Court to avoid
Section 230 immunity, and the court rejected all but one. Plaintiffs first
See also Doe v. Am. Online, 783 So. 2d at 1017 (affirming dismissal of
claims against AOL brought by mother of a minor after a predator
photographed him and marketed the photos in an AOL chat room: "AOL
falls squarely within [the] traditional definition of a publisher and,
therefore, is clearly protected by § 230's immunity .... It is precisely the
liability based upon negligent failure to control the content of users'
publishing of allegedly illegal postings on the Internet that is the gravamen
of [plaintiffs] alleged cause of action."); Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., 2009
WL 1704355, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 14,2009) (dismissing claims that
Craigslist failed to adequately monitor and police sales of merchandise on
its website, including a handgun used to shoot the plaintiff).
12
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asserted that Backpage.com is not immune because it has a category for
"escorts," see CP 195 ("[t]he information created by Backpage is the term
'escorts"'), which, they argued, is a euphemism for prostitution, meaning
that all ads in the category are unlawful, see CPI94-196, 198-201 .. The
Superior Court rejected this argument, noting that escort. advertising has
"been held to be legal," see RP 23:4-23:15, and the court's ~onclusion in
this regard is unquestionably correct. 13 See also Backpage.com, LLC v.
13 Escort services have long been recognized as legal, just as escort
advertising has appeared in newspapers and telephone directories for
decades. For example, Washington law defines retail sales subject to state
B&O taxes as including escort services, RCW 82.04.050, and many other
states recognize and regulate escort services, see, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 7-51-1102(11) & (12); 7-51-1116; Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-27-101 to108; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-422; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-25.5-103 to 5115. Some thirty-five cities and counties in Washington have license
requirements, impose taxes and fees, and otherwise regulate escorts and
escort services. See, e.g., Bellevue Mun. Code §§ 4.09.030.BB, 5.04.040;
Blaine Mun. Code ch. 5.12; Buckley Mun. Code § 6.12.030(16) & (17);
Carnation Mun. Code § 5.48.030; Cheney Mun. Code § 5.25.030;
CosmopolisMun. Code § 3.45.030; Darrington Mun. Code § 5.04.030;
DuPont Mun. Code §§ 3.07.040(p)(7), 5.04.060(b); DuvallMun. Code
§ 5.02.030.C.5 & .1; Ellensburg Mun. Code § 13.49.060; Everett Mun.
Code § 3.24.030; Fife Mun. Code § 19.06.235; Franklin County Code
§§ 5.16.010, 5.16.150; Gold Bar Mun. Code §§ 5.68.030, 5.68.070;
Jefferson County Code § 5.10.030; Kelso Mun. Code § 5.42.020.G &
5.42.100; Kitsap County Code § 10.52.0100); Lynnwood Mun. Code
§§ 3.104.010, 5.49.010.A & .B; Monroe Mun. Code § 5.48.020; Olympia
Mun. Code §§ 5.04.040,5.16.030.6;; Normandy Park Mun. Code
§ 4.14.030; Pierce County Code §§ 18.25.030, 18A.33.270; Port
Townsend Moo. Code §§ 5.04A.030, 5.92.030.N & .0; Poulsbo Mun.
Code ch. 5.10 & § 3. 12.040(F); Redmond Mun.Code § 5.68.030(P) &
(Q); Ridgefield Mun. Code § 3.04.030; Ruston Mun. Code § 5.01.030;
SeaTac Mun. Code §§ 5.40.030.H & 5.40.120; Snohomish County Code
§ 6.30.010(10) & (11); University Place Mun. Code § 19.10.030;
Stanwood Mun. Code §§ 5.32.020(g) & (n) & 5.32.110; Thurston County
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McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1282 (W.D. Wash. 2012); see also Dart,

665 F. Supp. 2d at 968 ("Plaintiff is simply wrong when he insists that [the
'erotic services' category and subcategories] are all synonyms for illegal
sexual services. "). Plaintiffs also claimed Backpage.com "develops"
content because it makes ads "usable and available" and "gather[s] and
.

.

organiz[es]" information. CP 196-197. The Superior Court also rejected
this argument; all web sites do this, RP 15: 1-15: 8, and a contrary rule
"would sap section 230 of all meaning." See Roommates. com, 521 F.3d at
1172 ("Of course, any classification of information ... could be construed
as 'develop[ment]' under an unduly broad reading of the term. But, once
again, such a broad reading would sap section 230 of all meaning. ").
However, the Superior Court ultimately credited Plaintiffs'
allegations that Backpage.coni was not entitled to Section 230 immunity
because it imposes rules prohibiting improper content. The court said it
was "most concerned [about] the posting guidelines," which could be taken
to mean that Backpage.com "know[s] this [i. e., ads on the website] is for
prostitution," and therefore is "assisting with the development" of content
on the site. RP 50:5-50:12. This conclusion is wholly unprecedented,
turns Section 230 upside down, and threatens to destroy this statutory
immunity for all online service providers.
Significantly, courts have often held that Section 230 immunity is.
supported by websites' rules and restrictions for user-generated content; no

Code § 22.04.543.G; Tumwater Mun. Code § 5.50.020.A.7; Woodinville
Mun. Code § 17.19.030(g); Woodland Mun. Code §§ 5.50.020, 5;50.090.
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court has ever held that immunity can be defeated by such rules. In Dart,
for example, the court concluded that the "[sheriff's] argument that
Craigslist causes or induces illegal content" was "undercut by the fact that
Craigslist repeatedly warns users not to post such content." 665 F. Supp.
2d at 969 (emphasis added). Even accepting the sheriff s allegations that
"users routinely flout Craigslist's guidelines," the court reasoned that
"Section 230(c)(1) would serve little if any purpose if companies like
Craigslist were found liable under state law for 'causing' or 'inducing'
users to post unlawful content" based on users' violations of its rules. Id.
Similarly, in Roommates. com, the Ninth Circuit explained its decision in
Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125, finding a dating site immune from a claim

premised on a user's defamatory post, as based in part on the fact that the
post was "contrary to the website's express policies." 521 F.3d at 1171.
As a result, the court noted, "[t]he claim against the website was in effect,
that it failed to [sufficiently] review each user-created profile," "precisely
the kind of activity for which Congress intended to grant absolution with
the passage of Section 230." Id. at 1171-72. See also Goddard, 640 F.
Supp. 2d at 1198 (rejecting plaintiffs attempt to hold Google liable for
third-party ads where they were "contrary to Google's express policy"
(internal quotation and alterations omitted)).
Furthermore, while the Superior Court credited Plaintiffs'
allegations that the posting rules could show that Backpage.cOni might
"know" that some ads on the site "[are] for prostitution," RP 50:9, "[i]t is,
by now, well established that notice of the unlawful nature of the
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I

information provided is not enough to make it the service provider's own
speech," Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420. In Schneider, Division I of this Court
found that Amazon.com was immune under Section 230 even though it had
actual knowledge of defamatory posts (because the plaintiff provided
notice), acknowledged that one or more of the posts violated its guidelines,
and failed to remove them. 108 Wn. App. at 463-64. This is the uniform
rule across the country, for "[l]iability upon notice would defeat the dual
purposes advanced by § 230." Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333. (notice-based
liability would destroy "the vigor of Internet speech and ... service
provider self-regulation"). 14 Thus, even if a provider has actual knowledge
that third parties are posting illegal content, "the service provider's failure
to intervene is immunized." Goddard, 2008 WL 5245490, at *3; see also
Gregerson v. Vilano Fin., Inc., 2008 WL 451060, at *9 n.3 (D. Minn. Feb.
15,2008) (upholding Section 230 immunity even after website operator
was made aware of objections to third-party comments posted on site);
MA., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1050-51.
Given that actual knowledge cannot defeat Section 230 immunity,
mere allegations that a website implicitly knew or should have known of
unlawful content cannot defeat immunity. This also is well established.
For example, in MA., the plaintiff alleged Backpage.com should have been

Notice-based liability would also subject websites to a "heckler's veto"
anytime anyone objects, because it would always be safer for online
providers to remove content rather than risk liability - giving anyone who
complains unfettered power to censor speech. See Reno v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997).
14
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"on notice that its website might be ... used for illegal purposes [but did
not] stop the ads from being posted and instead profited from such ads,"
but the court found it clear under Section 230 that "neither notice or profit
make Backpage liable for the content and consequences of the ads posted
by [the pimp]." 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1051; see also Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 55960 (finding Stubhub immune under Section 230, notwithstanding
allegations it knew or should have known users were selling tickets on the
website in violation of state anti-scalping laws). In short, until this case, no
court has ever held an online provider loses Section 230 immunity because
it allegedly knew, should have known, or might have known that content
on its site could be unlawful.
The Superior Court contradicted the case law in another important
respect by basing its decision on Plaintiffs' allegations about the
Backpage.com website as a whole; rather than focusing on whether
Backpage.com created or developed the specific ads at issue. I5 But, under
the established law, online service providers can be liable only for directly
participating in creating, requiring, or developing the specific content that
is unlawful. As the Ninth Circuit said in Roommates. com, immunity is lost

only when "the website directly participates in developing the alleged
illegality." 521 F.3d at 1174. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in Accusearch
15 Plaintiffs' complaint does not even identify the specific ads they
challenge, except to quote certain headlines (admittedly authored by the
pimps and not Backpage.com). See CP 16, 20 ~~ 4.1,6.3. Otherwise,
their allegations concern the website as a whole and ads having nothing to
do with Plaintiffs. See CP 7-10 ~~ 3.7,3.8,3.14 & CP 495-2771.
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held that a provider is responsible for user content "only if it ...
specifically encourages development of what is offensive about the
content." 570 F.3d at 1199. Likewise, s.c. v. Dirty World, LLC, 2012 WL
3335284 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12,2012), found a gossip website immune and
rejected the plaintiff's claims against the website as a whole "because
[Section 230] focuses on the specific post at issue." Id. at *4. And, in Hill
v. Stubhub, the court opined that the '''entire website' approach was fatally
flawed" in light of Section 230 and its purposes. 727 S.E.2d at 562. 16
That the Superior Court improperly accepted an "entire website"
approach is clear !rom its misunderstanding of the MA case. The court
said it believed MA. was distinguishable from the present case because, in
MA., "there [was] no allegation that Backpage was responsible for

development of any portion of the content" on the website. RP 43:1943:25. In fact, the plaintiff in MA. did allege that Backpage.com was
responsible for development of content on the website generally, 809 F.
Supp. 2d at 1044, but the court rejected all such allegations as insufficient
to defeat Section 230 immunity. Instead, the court found immunity

See also Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 2008
WL 450095, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15,2008) ("The issue ... is whether
Defendants are responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
deVelopment of the particular postings relating to [plaintiff] that are the
subject of this lawsuit." (emphasis added)); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125
(noting the key issue is whether the online service provider "created or
developed the particular information at issue"); Gentry v: eBay, Inc., 99
. Cal. App. 4th 816, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 717 n.11 (2002) ("The critical
issue is whether eBay acted as an information content provider with
respect to the information that appellants claim is false or misleading.").
16
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applied because the plaintiff did not allege (and could not show) that
"Backpage was responsible for the development of any portion of the
content of [the] posted ads" at issue. 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1152 (emphasis in
original). Again, the allegations in this case are no different; the
complaint does not allege Backpage.com created any of the content of the
ads concerning Plaintiffs but rather admits that the pimps authored the
'content and posted these ads. CP 2-20 ~~ 1.2,2.8,4.1,6.2,6.3. In such
circumstances, Section 230 plainly applies.
If Plaintiffs' bare allegations that Backpage.com's rules forbidding
improper content are sufficient to defeat immunity, Section 230 could be
avoided in every case merely by alleging a website's rules and restrictions
mean the opposite of what they say. For example, Plaintiffs' warped
interpretation would mean the result in Schneider should have been the
opposite, because Amazon.com's rules prohibit defamatory reviews by
users, but the user in th,at case violated the rules. See 108 Wn. App. at 464.
Or, under Plaintiffs' theory, eBay would lose immunity for user listings
about misrepresented or counterfeit goods because the site's rules prohibit
such posts. 17 Even more to the point, online providers such as Craigslist,
Facebook, YouTube, Match.com, and countless others would be at risk,
because their posting rules are similar to or the same as Backpage.com's

17 Courts have found eBay immune from such claims. See, e.g., Gentry v.
eBay, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715-18 (refusing to hold eBay responsible for
third-party sales of forged sports memorabilia).
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rules. I8 Given these similarities, as well as Plaintiffs' admission that
Backpage.com does remove ads that violate its rules, see CP 8 ~ 3.9,
Plaintiffs' efforts to paint the Backpage.com posting rules as a nefarious
scheme should be seen for what they really are, i.e., Plaintiffs' scheme to
avoid Section 230 with nothing but unsupported arguments.
Simply put, if allowed to stand, the Superior Court's decision
would eviscerate Section 230; it would cause online providers to do the
opposite of what Congress intended. Rather than police user content,
web sites would be far better offto impose no rules or restrictions and do
no monitoring, because they would only create liability risks by

undertaking such efforts. See Backpage.com v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d
at 1273 (making Backpage.com or other websites liable for efforts to
prohibit content would "create[] an incentive for online service providers
not to monitor the content that passes through [their] channels[,] precisely

For example, Craigslist's "Adult Services Posting Guidelines" are
essentially identical to Backpage.com's rules; they also prohibit
(1) "content that is unlawful, obscene, or which advertises illegal services,"
(2) ads that "suggest or imply an exchange of sexual favors for money"
including by use of "any and all code words" (giving sexually explicit
examples); (3) any "attempt to avoid detection of forbidden language by
using spelling variations" (again providing explicit examples); and (4) "ads
containing obscene images." See www.craigslist.org/aboutJhelp/
Adult_Services_ Posting_Guidelines. Match.com imposes rules for usersubmitted images precluding "[p]hotos with nudity or sheer, or otherwise
'see-through,' material below the waist," www.match.comlphotomanager/
phototips.aspx, as well as other rules similar to Backpage.com's,
www.match.comlregistrationlmembagr.aspx. Facebook's and Y ouTube' s
rules are also similar. See www.facebook.comlcommunitystandards.
www.youtube.comltlcommunity~uidelines.
18
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the situation that [Section 230] was enacted to remedy"); see also Nemet
Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 258 (plaintiffs claims would thwart Congress's
purpose to "remove disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies" (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4)));
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028; Langdon v. Google, Inc.; 474 F. Supp. 2d 622,
631 (D. Del. 2007).
At bottom, Congress made a policy choice in Section 230 to
promote robust Internet free speech and encourage online providers to selfpolice user content, "and immunity is the form of that encouragement."
Schneider, 108 Wn. App at 463. It is not for the Superior Court,this
Court, or any other court to substitute a different choice. See Doe v.
MySpace, 528 F.3d at 419; Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123. The Superior
Court's decision would undermine Section 230 and the critical national
policies it reflects.

F.

Dismissal Is Appropriate, Irrespective of Any
Differences Between State and Federal Pleading
Standards.

In refusing to find Backpage.com immune under Section 230, the
Superior Court apparently felt constrained by Washington's pleading
standards for CR 12(b)(6) motions, see RP 4:13-4:14, 18:7-18:8,29:629:9, which are more deferential toward plaintiffs than the rule in federal
courts. See McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, 169Wn.2d 96, 102-03,233
P.3d 861 (2010). However, the Superior Court should have dismissed this
. case regardless. Washington's procedural rules do not require courts to
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accept legal conclusions, arguments, or irrelevant fact allegations, which is
all that Plaintiffs' complaint offers. Moreover, if state procedural
standards interfere with enforcement of federal substantive rights - here,
Backpage.com's right to Section 230 immunity - the state standards are
preempted.
1.

Washington CR 12(b)(6) Standards Require
Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Claims.

Civil Rule 12(b)(6) is intended to ''weed[] out complaints where,
even if what the plaintiff alleges is true, the law does not provide a
remedy." McCurry, 169 Wn.2d at 102. "Dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) is
appropriate in those cases where the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts,
consistent with the complaint that would entitle the plaintiff to relief."
Perry v. Rado, 155 Wn. App. 626, 635-36,230 P.3d 203 (2010).
Dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) is particularly appropriate for claims
preempted under federal law or barred by immunity. Schneider, 108 Wn.
App. at 454, is the most analogous example, as the Court there affirmed a
12(b)(6) dismissal and found Amazon immune under Section 230,
rejecting all of the plaintiffs attempts to avoid the statute. But many other
cases demonstrate the same principle. See, e.g., Gorman v. Garlock, Inc.,
155 Wn.2d 198,215-219, 118 P.3d 311 (2005) (affirming 12(b)(6)
dismissal of shipyard workers' claims as preempted by the federal
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); Parsons v. Corncast
oJCal./Colo./Wash., Inc., 150 Wn. App. 721, 729, 208 P.3d 1261 (2009)
(preemption under federal Cable Act); Regan v. McLachlan, 163 Wn.
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App. 171, 257 P .3d 1122 (2011) (affinning 12(b)(6) dismissal based on
quasi-judicial immunity).19 Since the purpose of immunity is to provide
"an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability ... , it is
critical that insubstantial claims be resolved as quickly as possible."
Robinson v. City o/Seattle, 119 Wn.2d 34, 65, 830 P.2d 318 (1992)
(emphasis supplied by the court) (internal quotation and citation omitted);
see Bailey v. State, 147 Wn. App. 251, 259, 191 P.3d 1285 (2008)?0

See also, e.g., Parrott-Horjes v. Rice, 168 Wn. App. 438,450,276 P.3d
376 (2012) (preemption under Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance
Act); Howell v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 99 Wn. App. 646,652-53,994 P.2d
901 (2000) (preemption under Airline Deregulation Act); Rodriguez v.
Loudeye Corp., 144 Wn. App. 709, 719-20, 189 P.3d 168 (2008) (statutory
immunity of corporate directors); Jeckle v. Crotty, 120 Wn. App. 374,
386, 85 P.3d 931 (2004) (immunity of attorneys and law finns for acts
arising out of representing their clients).
19

Both preemption and immunity are issues of law. McCurry, 169 Wn.2d at
101 (preemption); Michaels v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 171 Wn.2d 587,597,257
P.3d 532 (2011) (statutory immunity).
20 This is especially important in cases implicating free speech rights, such
as this one. The Washington Supreme Court has explained that "summary
procedures are ... essential" to prevent "long and expensive litigation"
threatening "First Amendment rights [by] the harassment of lawsuits"
because, otherwise, the result will be "self-censorship affecting the whole
public, [which] is hardly less virulent for being privately administered."
Markv. Seattle Times, 96 Wn.2d 473,484-85,635 P.2d 1081 (1981);
accord Mohr v. Grant, 153 Wn.2d 812,821, 108 P.3d 768 (2005)
("Serious problems regarding the exercise of free speech and free press
guaranteed by the First Amendment are raised if unwarranted lawsuits are
allowed to proceed to trial. The chilling effect of the pendency of such
litigation can itself be sufficient to curtail the exercise of these freedoms."
(internal quotations omitted)).

40

This is precisely the point of Section 230 - the statute provides

immunity from suit, and so should be applied at the earliest possible
juncture, i.e., a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss:
As we have often explained in the qualified innnunity
context, "immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a
mere defense to liability" and "it is effectively lost if a case
is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Brown v. Gilmore,
278 F.3d 362, 366 n.2 (4th Cir.2002) (quotations omitted)
(emphasis in original). We thus aim to resolve the question
of § 230 immunity at the earliest possible stage of the case
because that immunity protects websites not only from
"ultimate liability," but also from "having to fight costly
and protracted legal battles~" Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at
1175.

Nemet Chevrolet, 591 F.3d at 254-55; see also MCW, Inc. v.
Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, 2004 WL 833595, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Apr.
19,2004) (recognizing Section 230 "is an appropriate ground for dismissal
... under Rule 12(b)(6)" because defendant's immunity under the statute
"would preclude [plaintiff] from establishing a set of facts that would
entitle it to relief').
Plaintiffs' mantra below was that the Superior Court had to accept
all their allegations, whether arguments or fact allegations, and despite
whether they were conclusory, unsupported or based on speculation. See,

e.g., CP 190. In response to Plaintiffs' assertions that they were entitled
all inferences, the Superior Court stated "You're preaching to the choir. "
RP 29:6-29:9. As noted, the court expressed reluctance to grant, dismissal

because of the CR 12(b)(6) standards, commenting "honestly, ... of all the
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cases in terms ofthe 12(b)(6) [this] is the closest I've ever come .... [I]1's
right on the line." RP 49:21-49:24.
In fact, Plaintiffs' arguments are wrong and the Superior Court's
reticence was mistaken under CR 12(b)(6) standards. While a court must
treat well-pleaded factual allegations in a complaint as true, it need not
accept legal conclusions or conclusory allegations. Haberman v.Wash.
Pub. Power Supply Sys., 109 Wn.2d 107, 120, 744 P.2d 1032, 750 ~.2d

254 (1987); Rodriguez, 144 Wn. App. at 717-18; Clallam Cnty. Citizens
for Safe Drinking Water v. City of Port Angeles, 137 Wn. App. 214, 227,

151 P.3d 1079 (2007). The Washington Supreme Court's decision in
State ex rei. Pirak v. Schoettler, 45 Wn.2d 367,369,274 P.2d 852 (1954),
cited in Haberman, 109 Wn.2d at 120, illustrates this distinction. There,

the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the director of fisheries had
violated a state statute prohibiting the use of "fish traps" or "fixed
appliance[s]" to catch salmon by issuing licenses for "reef nets." 45
Wn.2d at 369. The plaintiff repeatedly referred to reef nets as "fish traps"
and "fixed appliances" in his petition and argued that, because the case
was on a demurrer, the court had to accept his allegations. The Supreme
Court disagreed, finding the allegations did not state facts, but went to "the
fundamental legal issue in the case," i. e., whether the statutory definitions
of "fish traps" and "fixed appliances" included reef nets. Id. at 370.
"Only facts stated in the petition which are well pleaded are to be
considered, and conclusions of the pleader are to be disregarded." Id.
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In this case, the Superior Court went beyond just accepting
Plaintiffs' factual allegations,21 instead crediting Plaintiffs' contentions
that Backpage.com "assisted in developing" content and therefore could
be considered an "information content provider" under Section 230,
because it imposes rules to prevent improper posts. As in Pirak, these are
the "fundamental legal issue [s]" about the meaning of Section 230, which
the court should not have accepted. 22

The/acts Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint are that they are minors,
CP 1-2 ~~ 1.1, 1.2; they were victimized and prostituted by three adult
pimps, CP 2-20 ~~ 1.2,4.1,4.2,5.1,5.2,6.1,6.2, the pimps created and
posted ads about the Plaintiffs on Backpage.com, id. ~~ 1.2, 2.8, 4.1, 5.2,
6.2,6.3; the Backpage.com website includes an "escorts" category, with
various subcategories, id. ~~ 3.5,3.13; the website charges a fee for ads
posted in that category; id. ~ 3.2; Backpage.com imposes rules for ads
precluding (among other things) sexually expli9it language, naked images,
solicitations for prostitution or illegal services, or materials that exploit
minors, id. ~~ 3.6, 3.9, 3.13, 3.19; Backpage.com removes ads that violate
these requirements, id. ~ 3.9; users have no contact with Backage.com
except through an automated process, id. ~ 3.19; and the ads posted by
Hopson and the other pimps concerning the Plaintiffs appeared to comply
with the site's rules, id. ~~ 4.1,5.2,6.4. Backpage.com acknowledged the
Superior Court should accept these facts on a CR 12(b)(6) motion, but
urged that the court should not credit Plaintiffs' arguments and
conclusions. See CP 370.

21

22 Even if the court could have treated Plaintiffs' arguments and
conclusions as fact allegations, it still should have disregarded them as
irrelevant. When factual allegations are immaterial because they would
not entitle the plaintiff to relief regardless, a court should disregard them
and dismiss the complaint as a matter oflaw. Haberman, 109 Wn.2d at
121. As shown above, Plaintiffs cannot defeat Section 230 immunity by
(1) attacking the Backpage.com website as a whole; (2) alleging
Backpage.com knows or should know of unlawful content on its site; (3)
alleging Backpage.com encourages unlawful content; or (4) claiming the
site earns revenues and profits; None of this matters, because, as
explained above, such allegations cannot overcome Section 230 immunity.
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2.

State Procedural Rules Cannot Usurp Federal
Substantive Rights.

As discussed above, two federal courts previously enforced Section
230 and dismissed identical claims against Backpage.com, MA. v. Village

Voice, 809 F; Supp. 2d 1041, and substantially similar claims against
Craigslist, Dart v. Craigslist, 665 F. Supp. 2d 961. See Section IV.D,
above. As also shown, if properly applied, the CR 12(b)(6) standards and
the principles of Section 230 should lead to the same result here. See
Section IV.F.1, above. To the extent the Superior Court felt constrained to
reject federal case law because of Washington's more lenient CR 12(b)(6)
pleading standards, it erred for the separate reason that state procedural
rules cannot trump federal substantive rights.
As the United States Supreme Court has held, when a state court
confronts a federal substantive right, "the 'federal right cannot be defeated
by the forms oflocal practice.'" Brown v. W. Ry. ofAla., 338 U.S. 294,
296 (1949). Thus, in Brown, the. Court reversed dismissal of a claim under
the federal Employers' Liability Act, where the lower court had relied on a
state pleading standard construing allegations "most strongly against the
pleader." Id. at 295. The Court held the state procedural standard
preempted because it would have interfered with a federal substantive
right. Id. See also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. l31, l38 (1988) (refusing to
enforce state law requiring notice of claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in part
because it would "frequently and predictably produce different outcomes in

§ 1983 litigation based solely on whether the claim is asserted in state or
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federal court"). Washington courts recognize and apply this doctrine. See
Stanton v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 123 Wn.2d 64, 82,866 P.2d 15 (1993)
(federal maritime law precluded application of state economic loss rule;
"the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is
constrained by a so-called 'reverse-Erie' doctrine which requires that
substantive remedies afforded by the States conform to governing federal
maritime standards").
Thus, although
"[f]ederallaw takes state courts as it finds them,"
,
Felder, 487 U.S. at 150, that is so only when state rules do not "impose
unnecessary burdens upon rights ... authorized by federal laws. " Brown,
338 U.S. at 298-99. That would be the result here if Washington's CR
12(b)(6) standard allows Plaintiffs' claims to proceed in state court,
notwithstanding overwhelming authority barring such claims in federal
court. Otherwise, online service providers would face unique and
unpredictable results when they seek to enforce Section 230 rights in
Washington. But "the [I]nternet does not recognize geographic
boundaries," Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F .3d 96, 103 (2d Cir.
2003), and that is why Congress granted immunity from state,laws to
eliminate a patchwork of different and potentially inconsistent state
regulation. PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227,240 (4th Cir. 2004) (a
state's efforts to regulate the Internet "highlights the likelihood that a
, single actor might be subject to haphazard, uncoordinated, and even
outright inconsistent regulation .... " (quoting Am. Libraries Ass 'n v.
.Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
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This Court can and should respect Section 230 immunity and
Congress's intent without having to address whether Washington CR
12(b)(6) standards must yield or are preempted. The Court need.only
confront this issue if it concludes that the result in Washington state courts
would differ from the uniform, overwhelming body of law in federal
courts, which it should not.

V.

CONCLUSION

The Superior Court erred by denying Backpage.com's motion to
dismiss. Its decision contravenes the letter and intent of Section 230, as
well as an enormous body of established law interpreting the statute for
over seventeen years since its passage. The court's decision, if allowed to
stand, would threaten online service providers across the Internet and
could expose providers to different, contrary and unpredictable liability
risks in Washington, as nowhere else. This Court should respect the broad
and important immunity afforded by Section 230, to preserve robust free
speech and encourage self-policing on the Internet, as Congress intended.
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